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Abstract
A data intermediary pays consumers for information about their preferences, and
sells the information so-acquired to firms that use it to tailor their product offers
and prices. The social dimension of the individual data– whereby an individual’s
data is predictive of the behavior of others– generates a data externality that reduces
the intermediary’s cost of acquiring information. We derive the data intermediary’s
optimal information policy, and show that it preserves privacy over the identity of the
consumers, but provides precise information about market demand to the firms.
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1 Introduction
Individual Data and the Internet The rise of large Internet platforms, such as Face-
book, Google, and Amazon in the US, and similar large entities in China, such as JD, Tencent
and Alibaba has lead to an unprecedented collection and commercial use of individual data.
The ever increasing user base of these platforms generates massive amounts of data about
individual consumers, their preferences, their locations, their friends, their political views,
and almost all other facets of their lives. In turn, many of the services provided by large In-
ternet platforms rely critically on these data. The availability of individual-level data allows
these companies to offer refined search results, personalized product recommendations, in-
formative ratings, timely traffi c data, and targeted advertisements. Bergemann and Bonatti
(2019) provide a recent introduction.
A central feature of the data collected from the individuals is its social aspect. Namely, the
data captured from an individual user is not only informative about that specific individual,
but also about (appropriately defined) nearby individuals. Thus, the individual data is
really social data. The social nature of the data generates a data externality. In the context
of geolocation data, an individual user conveys information about the traffi c conditions for
nearby drivers. In the context of shopping data, an individual’s purchases convey information
about the willingness to pay for a given product of consumers with similar purchase histories.
The recent disclosures on the use and misuse of social data by Internet platforms indicate
the need to reflect about the largely unsupervised and unregulated use of individual data by
these companies. To the extent that individual users provide most of the original data in
their interaction with these platforms, it is important to understand the nature of the trade
between Internet platforms and their users, and whether individual consumers receive the
appropriate compensation for their data.1
This question gains importance in the presence of the externality generated by the social
data. We know that in the presence of economic externalities, such as the environmental
externality of carbon emissions, the market by itself rarely guarantees the socially effi cient
outcome. In the case of data markets, this means that granting individuals control rights
over their personal data is likely an insuffi cient intervention.
We analyze three critical aspects of the economics of social data. First, how the collection
of individual data changes the terms of trade between consumers, advertisers, and large
Internet platforms. Second, how the social dimension of the data magnifies the value of
1The Stigler Committee on Digital Platforms (2019) notes that “Many technology platforms are distinctive
because they provide valued services to consumers without charging a monetary price. Instead, consumers
barter their attention and data to the platforms in exchange for these services. The platforms use that
attention and data to generate monetary payments from advertisers.”
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individual data for the platforms. Third, how the indirect sale of data (e.g., through the
provision of targeted advertising) changes the information available in equilibrium about
individual consumers.
How Data is Used The business models of large Internet platforms share some important
structural similarities. To a first approximation, companies such as Amazon, Facebook, and
Google are technology platforms that facilitate matches. The collection of data about the
matching partners is then critical for the success of these platforms: a larger database about
the characteristics of potential partners increases the quality and quantity of matches (see
Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2018)). These companies monetize the value of their
matching services mostly through advertising revenues. Thus, the information about an
individual consumer impacts the volume of trade and the level of surplus generated on a
platform (see Bergemann and Morris (2019)).
However, the very same information that is valuable to form a good match will typically
also impact the way the resulting surplus is distributed. In particular, advertisers value
the information that the Internet platforms collect, as it enables to segment the market by
tailoring their advertising and pricing decisions (see Bergemann and Bonatti (2015)). For
example, if a seller had even partial information about buyers, it could offer different product
varieties to different subsets of consumers, or charge different prices to different segments of
the population, on the basis of some observable characteristics. In all these cases, information
allows sellers to change the terms of trade. Thus, information not only affects the amount of
surplus generated online; it can significantly change the way in which that surplus is shared
between buyers and sellers.
The value of information can then be positive for one party and negative for the other
party. Indeed, the ability to tailor the terms of trade clearly benefits the sellers, who can
reach more customers and offer them tailored products at prices that are closer to their
willingness to pay. In contrast, the impact of the additional data on consumer surplus is less
clear cut. While perfect price discrimination is clearly harmful for the consumer, whether
other forms of market segmentation are harmful or beneficial is a priori ambiguous– see
Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2015) for a general statement and result. Therefore, the
overall effect of information markets on consumer welfare is entirely an empirical matter.
However, a key open question for economic theory is whether the market for social data
leads to an effi cient allocation of information.
A Model of Data Intermediation We develop a model of data intermediation with
three types of economic agents: consumers, firms, and data intermediaries. These agents
3
interact in two distinct but linked markets: a data market and a product market.
In the product market, each consumer (she) decides upon the quantity she wishes to
purchase and a single firm (he) decides the unit price at which it offers the product to
the consumer. In the product market, there is demand uncertainty, and each consumer
experiences a demand shock. While the producer knows the (common) prior distribution of
the demand shocks, he does not know the realization of the individual demand shocks.
In the data market, the data intermediary can acquire demand information from the
individual consumers and then sell the data in some, possible aggregated and bundled version
to the firm. The data intermediary can choose how much information to buy from the
consumers and how much information to sell to the firm.
We refer to the data market as the upstream market and the product market as the
downstream market. First, the data is exchanged in the data market. Second the producer
offers prices in the product market. It is the pricing decision of the producer that links the
product market and the data market. As the pricing policy of the firm responds to the data
acquired, it provides the interaction between the data market and the product market.
The Value and Price of Social Data The social dimension of the data– whereby an
individual’s data is also possibly predictive of the behavior of others– is critical to understand
the consumer’s incentives to share her data with a large platform. A naive argument suggests
that, as consumers become better informed and empowered to take control of their data, firms
will need to compensate them for their information, which will disrupt their business model.
Indeed, if a consumer anticipates any negative consequences of revealing her information,
she may demand compensation, e.g., through the quality of the services received.
However, this argument ignores the social aspect of the data. The consumer’s choice
to provide information is guided only by her private benefits and costs, i.e., the externality
generated by the individual data he provides is not part of her decision making. It follows
that a platform has to compensate the individual consumer only to the extent that the
disclosed information affects her own welfare. Conversely, the platform does not have to
compensate the individual consumer for any changes she causes in the welfare of others, nor
for any changes in her welfare caused by information revealed by others. In consequence,
the cost of acquiring the individual data can be substantially below the value of information
to the platform.
The resulting difference between the possible revenue gain in the interaction with many
consumers and the small compensation necessary to acquire that information likely drives
the extraordinary appetite of the Internet platforms to gather information.2 We can now see
2The Furman report identifies “the central importance of data as a driver of concentration and barrier to
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how social data drives a wedge between the effi cient and the profitable uses of information.
While many uses of consumer information exhibit positive externalities (e.g., real-time traffi c
information for driving directions), very little stands in the way of the platform trading data
for profitable uses that are, in fact, harmful to consumers. The presence of an informational
externality thus indicates that the standard argument for competitive prices to establish
effi cient trade does not necessarily operate in these markets.
Data Intermediary - Data Platform - Data Aggregator The model of data inter-
mediation suggested here most immediately reflects the business model of data brokers. But
in fact our results apply directly to a large class of data platforms. It might be useful to
distinguish between three different types of data platforms: (i) data brokers who buy and
sell information; (ii) product data platforms; and (iii) social data platforms. By product
data platform, we refer to data platforms such as Amazon, Uber and Lyft that acquire in-
dividual data from the consumer through the purchase of services and products. By social
data platform, we refer to the internet platforms like Google and Facebook which offer data
services to individual users, offer them digital services, and sell the information mostly in
the form of advertising placement to third parties. Relative to the basic model that we
analyze, the difference between the data intermediary and the product platform is that the
product platform combines in a single-decision maker the role of data intermediation and
product pricing. As we will see, the transfer of information between the data intermediary
and the product firm maximizes the joint surplus of the two entities, and thus our results
will apply directly to the analysis of the product platform. A distinguishing feature of social
data platforms is that these platforms typically trade individual consumer information for
services rather than for money. The data externality then expresses itself in the level of
service (i.e., in quantity and/or quality) rather than in the level of monetary compensation.
In addition, the information is frequently sold item-by-item in an auction format.3
Related Literature Our analysis is related to, among others, the model of selling in-
formation in Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin (2018). Relative to our earlier work, the
framework in Section 2 introduces the problem of sourcing information from an individual
competition in digital markets” (Digital Competition Expert Panel (2019)). The social dimension of data
helps explain these forces.
3The distinction in the data gathering model translates naturally into different kinds of social data being
collected. The data gathered on facebook, instgram, snapchat most directly corresponds to social data that
maps into a social network. Data product platform establish social networks through revealed preference in
terms of similar purchase behavior, similar demographics. In terms, data brokers buy and sell both direct
and indirect social data. To a first approximation, the differences in the data can be represented in terms of
their informativeness about the demand of the consumer.
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consumer who makes her participation decision ex ante. In other words, the consumer makes
a single decision as to whether to use a platform’s services, rather than trying to influence
a data broker’s perception of her type, as in Bonatti and Cisternas (2019). Our work is also
related to the analysis of the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in Berge-
mann, Brooks, and Morris (2015), and to the model of market segmentation with second
degree price discrimination in Haghpanah and Siegel (2019).
Ichihashi (2019) studies competing data intermediaries who acquire perfect information
from consumers. His model predicts multiple equilibria, in some of which competition hurts
consumers equally as monopoly– see also Westenbroek, Dong, Ratliff, and Sastry (2019). In
contrast, our competition model assumes the information collected by each broker contains
noise, which means information collected by each broker will never be valueless. This leads
to uniqueness of equilibrium. In this equilibrium the consumers surplus are worse off than in
the monopoly environment. Choi, Jeon, and Kim (2019) consider a model of privacy in which
data collection requires consumers’consent. They emphasize the information externalities
and coordination failures among users as drivers for excessive loss of privacy.
Finally, independent work by Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar (2019)
also studies an environment with data externalities. Their work is different from and largely
complementary to ours. In particular, they analyze a network economy where asymmetric
users with exogenous privacy concerns trade information with a data platform, and they
derive conditions under which the provision of information is (in)effi cient.
2 Model
We initially consider the case of a single data intermediary in the data market, and a sin-
gle firm in the product market. In later sections, we generalize the analyze and allow for
competition in the data market.
2.1 Product Market
Consumers There are finitely many consumers, labelled i = 1, ..., N . In the product
market, each consumer chooses a quantity level qi to maximize her net utility given a unit
price pi offered by the firm to consumer i:





Each consumer i has a true willingness-to-pay for the firm’s product that is given by:
wi , θ + θi. (2)
The willingness-to-pay wi of consumer i is the sum of a common demand shock θ and an
idiosyncratic demand shock θi. Thus, the demand of each consumer has a component θ that
is common to all consumers in the market, and an idiosyncratic component θi that reflects
the idiosyncractic taste. Throughout, we assume that all random variables are normally















Producer The producer can choose the unit price pi at which he offer his product to each
consumer i. The producer has a linear production cost
c (q) , c · q, for some c > 0.




(qi − c) pi.
The producer knows the structure of the demand, and thus the common prior distribution
given by (3). But absent any additional information from the data intermediary, the firm
does now know the realized demand shocks prior to setting his price. As a consequence, in
the absence of any additional information from the data intermediary, it is optimal for the
producer to offer a uniform unit price to all consumers.
2.2 Data Market
The data market is run by a monopolist data intermediary. The data intermediary can
acquire demand information from the individual consumers and then packages the demand
information and sell it to the firm. We consider bilateral contracts between the data interme-
diary and individual consumers, as well as between the data intermediary and the producer.
The data intermediary offers the bilateral contracts ex-ante, that is before the realization of
any demand shocks. Each bilateral contract determines a data price and a data policy.
The data price determines the fee for the transfer of information. The data policy deter-
mines the flow of information. The data policy allows the data intermediary to control the
7
in-flow as well as the out-flow of information. Thus, the data intermediary can control the
price as well as the design of the information (flow). As the market maker, the data inter-
mediary decides how to collect the information from the consumers, and how to transmit it
to the firm. Thus, the data intermediary faces an information design problem.
The data and product markets are summarized in Figure 2.2 below.
Data Intermediation
With respect to the information flows, we maintain the restriction to normally distributed
random variables. Each consumer observes a noisy signal of her willingness-to-pay:
ri , wi + ζ + ζ i. (4)
The noise can have common and idiosyncratic component, ζ and ζ i, respectively. The noise
variables are independent with zero mean and variance σ2ζ and σ
2
ζi
. The signal ri may reflect
the data-producing activity of the consumer. For example, we may interpret ri as the search
term that consumer i enters into a search engine like Google or her activity on a social
network like Facebook. In addition to the value of ri, the identity of consumer i is itself also
privately known by i.
The (symmetric) data policies with respect to the consumers are exhaustively described
by the following class of random variables:
si , ri + ε+ εi. (5)
Thus, the data in-flow from consumer i, which is her noisy private information ri, may be
8




respectively. We refer to the in-flow data described by si as an information structure Si.




αijwj + η + ηi, (6)
with weights αij ∈ R. The data out-flow may again be subject to a common and an idiosyn-





, correspondingly. We refer
to the out-flow data described by t = (t1, .., ti, ..., tI) as the information structure T .
The data intermediary makes a bilateral offer to each consumer i with the terms under
which the consumer will share her information. Thus, the data intermediary offers an infor-
mation structure and a monetary fee mi (T ) to consumer i for the transmitted information,
mi : Si → R. (7)
The information structure Si being transmitted can be the entire information of consumer i
or some, possibly noisy, statistic of her information, as described above.
Similarly, the data intermediary offers to share its information about the consumers with
the firm, and in exchange asks for a transfer fee
m0 : T → R. (8)
The objective function of the data intermediary is to maximize the net revenue it receives





A priori, the respective monetary fees can be positive or negative. The data structure in the
data market is given by (S, T ).
2.3 Equilibrium and Timing
The game proceeds sequentially. First, the terms for trade on the data market are de-
termined, and then the terms of trade in the product market are established. Thus, we
sometimes refer to the data and product market as upstream and downstream markets,
respectively.
The data intermediary can commit to bilateral contracts with the consumers and to a
bilateral contract with the firm. The contract or mechanism determines how much informa-
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tion gets transmitted and how the information is used. Given the information received, the
firm then chooses to optimally employ its information in the interaction with the consumers.
The firm therefore does not commit itself to any particular use of the information received.
This allows the firm to use the information opportunistically.
At the contracting stage, the information is imperfect but symmetric, and hence it suffi ces
to consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The analysis thus proceeds by
backward induction.
Given an agreed data policy (S, T ), the pricing policy of the firm is informed by the data
out-flow that it receives, thus
p∗ : T → RN
The optimal price can be a vector of individualized prices, thus p∗ (t) ∈ RN .




qi (pi − c) |S, T
]
.
Proceeding backwards, if the firm accepts the proposal of the data intermediary then its
profit is given by:
Πi (S, T ) , E
[∑
i
qi (pi − c) |S, T
]
−m0 (T ) .
By contrast, if the firm chooses not enter into a contract with the data intermediary, then
the profit of the firm is given by:
Πi (S,∅) , E
[∑
i
qi (pi − c) |S,∅
]
.
If the firm does not receive any information from the data intermediary, it will not have pay









qi (pi − c)
]
.
The participation constraint for the firm is thus
Πi (S, T ) ≥ Πi (S,∅) . (9)
Proceeding backwards, the data intermediary, having put a data policy S into place, offers a
data policy T , possibly as a function of S, thus T (S) and an associated data pricem0 (T (S))
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that maximizes its overall data revenue:
R (S, T (S)) = m0 (T (S)) +
I∑
i=1
mi (S) . (10)
Proceeding backwards on step further, each consumer receives an offer for a data contract
(Si,mi (Si)). We denote the expected utility of consumer i from data sharing by
Ui (S, T (S)) , E [ui (wi, qi, pi) |S, T (S) ]−mi (Si) .
Each data contract (Si,mi (Si)) has to satisfy the participation constraint for each consumer.
The alternative to the proposed data contract is to decline the contract (Si,mi (Si)). The
resulting payoff, keeping the decision of the remaining consumers unchanged, then traces the
payoff consequences. Consumer i would not receive the compensation for the data, but also
not participate in the data sharing. Subsequently this may affect the optimal data policy
T (∅, S−i) and the resulting pricing policy, thus
Ui (∅, S−i, T (∅, S−i)) , E [ui (wi, qi, pi) |∅, S−i, T (∅, S−i) ] .
In equilibrium the data intermediary chooses a data policy (S, T (S)) that satisfies the par-
ticipation constraint of the firm (9) and the participation constraint of every consumer i:
Ui (S, T (S)) ≥ Ui (∅, S−i, T (∅, S−i)) , for all i. (11)
A recursive equilibrium is then given by a triple of in-flow data policy, out-flow data policy
and pricing policy:
{((S∗,m∗ (S)) ; (T ∗ (S) ,m∗ (T ∗ (S))) ; p∗ (T, S))} . (12)
We emphasize that the participation constraint of every consumer i and the firm are
required to hold at the ex-ante level. Thus, the consumer (and the firm) are agreeing to the
data policy before the realization of any specific willingness-to-pay wi. The choice of the ex-
ante participation constraint is meant to capture a situation where the consumer and the firm
accepts the “terms of use agreement”or “terms of service”before any particular consumption
choice or search event. This is similar to using Facebook, or amazon, or a search engine,
where the account is established before the realization of any particular event. In particular,
the consumer evaluates the consequence of the data-flow from an ex-ante point of view,
and requires a level of compensation that allows her to share the information. Conditional
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upon agreeing to share the information, there is no further incentive compatibility constraint
which would guarantee the interim optimality of sharing the information.
We note that the recursive structure of the equilibrium implies that the data intermediary,
once it has agreement about the data in-flow is at liberty to choose the data outflow so as to
maximize its revenue. The only restriction on the data policy is a measurability condition,
namely that the intermediary cannot sell more information than it has bought.
We can now summarize the exact timing of exogenous and endogenous variables, that is
data realization and strategic choices as follows:
1. The data intermediary offers a fee mi to each consumer i for the data acquisition. The
consumers simultaneously accept or reject the intermediary’s offer.
2. The data intermediary offers a fee m0 to the firm. The firm accepts or rejects the offer.
3. The data r and the information flow (s, t) are realized and transmitted according to
the terms of the bilateral contracts.
4. The firm set a unit price pi for each consumer i who makes a purchase decision qi.
3 Data in the Wild
We begin the analysis with a review of what the market outcome would be if the demand
information of the consumers would be available to the firm. In turn, the firm would use the
information to the extent possible in its pricing policy. In terms of the data policy it is thus
as if we were to assume that the data would flow without friction from the consumer to the
firm, and thus:
si = ti = wi, ∀i. (13)
With all the available information, the firm will pursue a personalized pricing policy towards
each individual consumer. As the true demand function of each consumer is given by:
qi = wi − pi,











The demand data thus allows the producer to engage in personalized pricing. Namely, the
producer adapts his pricing policy to the willingness-to-pay wi of consumer i. The producer
increases his price p∗i in response to an increase in demand. In response the equilibrium
quantity q∗i increases with the willingness-to-pay, but at half the rate it would if the consumer
where to face a constant price.
The knowledge of the demand data has distinct implications for consumers and producers.
In particular, we can compare the equilibrium outcome when the firm does not have any
demand data beyond the prior distribution and when the demand data is available to the firm.
The demand information allows the firm to engage in third degree price discrimination– the
producer gains in revenue from a more tailored price. However, the consumer loses due to
the distortion in her consumption that comes with a more responsive price. Consequently,
the social value of information is negative– the sum of the consumer and producer surplus
is declining with the data flow.
Proposition 1 (Third Degree Price Discrimination)
The demand data increases the profit of the producer, decreases the consumer surplus, and
decreases the social surplus.
This comparison brings us to the seminal result of Robinson (1933) and Schmalensee
(1981) regarding the impact of third-degree price discrimination in markets with linear de-
mand (and all markets served). To highlight the connection, consider a given information








= − cov [wi, p] +
1
2
var [p] + constant terms. (16)
Thus, the ability of the seller to tailor the price p to the willingness-to-pay is detrimental to
the consumer. The profit of the seller is a function of the price:
π = N · E [p]2 +N var [p] .
The complete availability of the demand data is admittedly an extreme benchmark in at
least two respects. First, the firm may only have access to some noisy version of the demand
data, and second it may only observe a sample of the consumer data. Thus, let us next
suppose the data flow would be given by:
si = ti = wi + ε+ εi, for i = 1, ..., k,
for some σ2ε, σ
2
εi
> 0, and and where k be strictly smaller than I.
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As the demand data becomes noisy, the ability of the producer to tailor the price to
the demand of the consumer weakens. Moreover, to the extent that the producer only
observes a subsample, he is restricted in his ability to offer personalized prices. The lack in
the precision of the individual data can, however, be partially compensated with aggregate
data. In this case, the firm’s pricing policy involves third-degree price discrimination. As
the demand shock of each consumer has an idiosyncratic as well as common component, the
producer can use the demand data from his entire sample to estimate the demand of any
specific consumer. The extent to which the aggregate demand data is informative about the
individual demand data depends on the variance of the common shock, denoted earlier by
σ2θ and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, denoted by σ
2
θi
. This suggests that there are
two limiting case of interest: (i) when there is only common demand uncertainty, and hence
σ2θi = 0; (ii) when there is only idiosyncratic demand uncertainty.
In these two limiting case, the impact that the additional information has on the revenue,
is always positive, but of a distinct qualitative nature. In this case of common demand
uncertainty, every additional sample allows the producer to reduce the common demand
uncertainty by a decreasing among in terms of the conditional variance. The seller will
maintain a uniform price towards the consumers , and the revenue function is concave in the
sample size k. By contrast if there is only idiosyncratic uncertainty, then each additional
sample unlocks the possibility of a personalized prices. It also help to reduce the common
noise ε in the observation and thus refine the personalized price on all the other consumer.
Thus, the revenue function is convex in the sample size k.
Proposition 2 (Noisy Individual Information)
Given the noisy individual demand data of k consumers, the profit of the firm is increasing
in k, and
1. it is convex in k if σ2θi = 0;
2. it is concave in k if σ2θ = 0.
So far, we assumed that the firm could gain access to individual demand data, and thus
could identify the demand data with a specific individual consumer. Frequently, the firm
might have noisy demand data but it may not be able to link the demand data to any
particular consumer. In this case, the demand data from a sample of k consumers simply
constitute aggregate demand data. As a consequence, the demand data will inform the firm
in its pricing policy towards the entire market, but it cannot provide support for personalized
pricing anymore.
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Proposition 3 (Noisy Aggregate Information)
Given the noisy aggregate demand data of k consumers:
1. the profit of the firm is increasing and concave in k;
2. the consumers’surplus is decreasing and convex in k;
3. the social surplus is decreasing and convex in k.
Thus, the aggregate demand data still allows the firm to perform third-degree price
discrimination but limits its ability to extract surplus from the individual consumer. The
above result would not change if the firm would have access to individual data, including
identifying information about the consumer, but could distinguish between the consumers
when it offers his product.
In the current model, the downstream interaction between the consumer and the firm
is represented by a model of third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, each consumer
has a linear demand given its expected willingness to pay and given any constant unit price
chosen by the firm. The individual (and the aggregate demand) are thus as in the classic
environment studied by Robinson (1933) and Schmalensee (1981). The central result in this
setting is that while the average demand will not change, social welfare is lower while the
firm’s profit is higher under more information (and segmentation). In Robinson (1933) and
Schmalensee (1981), the linear demand in each segment was implicitly assumed to arise from
an aggregation of individual consumer demand in each segment, whereas we take the linear
demand as coming from each consumer separately.
We briefly discuss a few implications that the choice of the downstream game has in the
larger context of this paper.
First, the results of In Robinson (1933) and Schmalensee (1981) establish that the social
value of information sharing are negative, as information that supports third-degree price
discrimination leads to a lower social welfare. Thus, we are starting (intentionally) in an
economic environment where absent market imperfection the information should not be
shared and transmitted. Alternatively, we could have considered other game forms in the
downstream interaction. To the extent, that the informational externality would have the
same sign, we expect the welfare result to be similar.
We restrict our attention to second degree price discrimination with linear price tariffs.
We could extend the analysis to consider a larger class of tariffs, say two-parts tariffs or
general non-linear price tariffs. The linear-quadratic specification of consumer and firm
means that many of results of Maskin and Riley (1984) apply here. In particular, the
average price per unit decreases with q, and that the optimal menu can be implemented
15
with a menu of two-part tariffs (see also Tirole (1988)). The disadvantage of the nonlinear
analysis is that the resulting indirect utility function will not be linear quadratic anymore,
and thus less amenable to the analysis of information design.
4 Data Rights and Data Intermediation
In contrast to the preceding analysis, where the consumer data was available "in the wild",
we now explicitly assign each consumer the ownership of her demand data. Thus, unless she
explicitly accepts an arrangement to share her data with a data intermediary, will remain
private information for her.
We begin with a preliminary result regarding the nature of the interaction between data
intermediary and firm. For the moment, we are considering the interaction between a single
data intermediary and firm. Given the in-flow data policy S that the intermediary has estab-
lished, the subsequent interaction between the intermediary and the single seller is effi cient
in the sense that the intermediary will implement a data outflow policy that maximize the
gross profits of the firm.
Proposition 4 (Data Outflow Policy)
The data intermediary will offer a complete information sharing data policy, T ∗ (S) = S, for
all S. The data policy T ∗ (S) = S maximizes the gross revenue of the firm among all feasible
outflow data policies given S.
This preliminary result remains valid until we introduce either competition among inter-
mediaries or among firms. Until then, that is until we arrive at Section 8, the above result
directs us towards the analysis of the in-flow data policy. This result also informs us that
the subsequent result not only apply to the tripartite setting of consumers, intermediary and
firm, but remain valid when intermediary and firm are acting as a single unit in pursuit of
maximizing revenue. This will then describe platforms that both collect data from consumers
and directly price services or goods to the consumers. The absence of any intermediation
is relevant for integrated product platforms such as Amazon or Uber. In other words, since
the interaction between data intermediary and firm occurs without friction (provided there
is only a single intermediary and downstream firm), the presence of external contracting of
the data does not matter for the structure of the optimal data policy.
4.1 Basic Data Intermediation
We begin the analysis with a basic version of data intermediation. The data broker collects
and aggregates the individual information of all the consumers. Subsequently, the data
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broker transmits the total demand information to the producer. In response, the producer
tailors the price to the individual consumer using the total demand information. We then ask
in Proposition 5 under what conditions a profitable market for data intermediation arises.
Proposition 5 (Basic Data Intermediation)
Suppose the broker transmits all information received.

















3. There exists a threshold n̄ such that the broker obtains positive profits if and only if the
number of consumers is n > n̄. (Need some condition, like σ2θ ≥ σ2ε)
A first step towards a more sophisticated data policy is anonymize the data and transmit
only the aggregate demand data. The aggregate demand is the average of the individual
demand. To the extent that the individual information transmitted by the consumer affects
the estimate, the consumer requires a compensation for the information. But the demand of
each individual consumer is coming from two sources, the idiosyncratic shock and the com-
mon shock. While each consumer has a monopoly over the transmission of the idiosyncratic
shock, the firm can learn about the common shock not only from consumer i, but from all
other consumers. This opens a wedge between the benefit of the information for the firm,
and the cost of the information for the individual consumer. The informational externality
is then at the source of the profitable trade of information for the data broker, even in the
absence of socially valuable information.
Proposition 6 (Basic Aggregate Information Intermediation )
Suppose the broker transmits only the aggregate demand information:
1. there exists a threshold n such that the broker obtains positive profits if and only if the
number of consumers is
n > n;




Within the confines of these elementary policies, we can then ask what is the preferred
information policy for the data intermediary. By comparing the revenues across these two
different information policies, we find that the data broker always prefers to simply transmit
the aggregate information. The intermediary thus does not attempt to elicit the identity of
the consumer at all.
Proposition 7 (Optimality of Aggregate Intermediation)
1. The thresholds satisfy the inequality:
n̄ ≥ n,
for all σ2θi and σ
2
θ.
2. The aggregate information transmission always generates a larger profit than the indi-
vidual information transmission.
By transmitting only the aggregate policy, the data market can operate profitably with
a smaller number of consumers, for any given constellation of σ2θi and σ
2
θ. More importantly,
the aggregate policy generates larger revenues for the intermediary for any size of the con-
sumer market. An important implication of this comparison is that the firm will not offer
personalized prices but rather adjust prices to the level of aggregate demand. This in itself
is an interesting finding as it suggests why we may see personalized prices in fewer settings
than initially anticipated.
For example, the merchandise platform amazon and the transportation platform uber
engage rarely in personalized pricing. Yet, the price of every single good or service is subject
to substantial variation. In light of the above result, we may interpret the restraint use of
personalized pricing in the presence of aggregate price volatility as the optimal trade-off in
the use of consumer information.
The information externality also informs us when trade of information is more likely to
arise. If the size of the idiosyncratic shock is large, or σ2θi is large, then the cost of compen-
sating the consumer is going to be large, and stand in the way of profitable intermediation.
It leads to a larger threshold n̄ when the trade can arise. By contrast, if the common shock
is large, or σ2θ is large, then the informational externality will allow the data broker to offer
favorable terms of trade earlier, in terms of the size of the market.
Proposition 7 has significant implications for the data ownership. We can contrast the
market outcome when the consumer data is freely available, thus there is no data ownership,
with the outcome under data ownership. With the data ownership, there might be still be
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socially ineffi cient price discrimination, but the contractual outcome will now preserve the
personal identity of the consumer. As an implication, there will not be personalized pricing
but rather variable pricing that adjust to the demand information that the merchant has.
4.2 Data Flow and Uncertainty
As we consider multivariate normally distributed uncertainty, the data structure will ul-
timately resolve in a description of mean and variance of the willingness-to-pay. As the
expectation of the mean will remain the same across all feasible data structures, a complete
data structure reduces to a description of the conditional variance of the willingness-to-pay
given the data policy. Thus, a more compact description of the data policy S or T is given by
the matrix of the variance of the conditional expectation. If we consider symmetric policies,








and the complete data policy configuration, in and out of equilibrium is given by (I + 1)×
(I + 1) dimensional matrix that represent the entire variance-covariance structure of the
in-flow (and out-flow data):
Σ =





ρ1Iσ1σI · · · σ2I ρIσIσ
ρ1σ1σ · · · ρIσIσ σ2
 . (18)
Thus, we could alternatively describe the indirect utility functions-the value functions-in
terms of the variance of the conditional expectation. This representation will be valuable
when we describe a larger class of linear-quadratic problems.
5 Information Design and Data Intermediation
We established the basic result regarding the possibility of trade in a very simple setting.
We restricted the informational policy of the intermediary in two important dimensions: (i)
the data broker was forwarding all the information, and (ii) the data broker only provided a
single aggregate estimate of the market. We now show that a more sophisticated information
policy can increase the revenue of the data broker. In particular, the data intermediary can
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choose to acquire the identity of consumer i and transmit it to the firm. The variance levels
of the additional noise terms, σ2η and σ
2
ηi
, as well as the decision to (de)-anonymize the data,
are the strategic variables of the data intermediary. When consumer i makes her purchase
decision qi, we assume that consumer i will have learned wi.







as errors in transmission (or equivalently, noise in the consumers’own
initial estimates). These are minimum noise levels that must be included by construction in













We now turn to the information structure that maximizes the broker’s profits.
Proposition 8 (Necessary and Suffi cient Condition for Data Intermediation)





The optimal common noise σ2ε is positive for σ
2
θi
large enough and n small enough.
Proposition 9 (Optimal Data Intermediation)
The broker’s optimal information structure is symmetric and
1. without aggregate noise: σ2εi = σ̂
2
ε;














































We note that the symmetry of the optimal information structure is established as part
of the argument. To do so, we fix the revenue of the broker (the total precision of the
information collected) and we show that symmetric payments minimize the cost of acquiring
the information. Intuitively, one can leverage the externality when buying from multiple
consumers, so symmetric schemes should be better.
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Figure 5.1 shows the optimal variance of the additional common noise term: if the con-
sumers’preferences are not suffi ciently correlated, the broker does not trade any information.
5.2 Intermediation with Commitment
A maintained feature in our analysis is that the data intermediary maintains complete con-
trol over the use of the acquired data. In particular, given the data acquired, the data
intermediary chooses the sequentially optimal data policy to be offered to the downstream
merchant. The sequential optimality reflects the substantial control that the data intermedi-
ary has regarding the use of the data. It also reflects the opacity in how the data-out flow is
linked to the data-in flow. In other words, it is diffi cult to establish how a given data input
has informed a given data output.
Nonetheless, it is informative to consider the implications of an enhanced ability by
the data intermediary to commit to a certain data policy vis-a-vis the consumers. Thus,
in this subsection we shall briefly describe what would happen under strong commitment
assumptions. Now, from Proposition 1 we learned that the unrestricted use of data leads to
a decrease in the consumer surplus as well as in the social surplus. This suggest that the
data intermediary could support a different data policy and realize a larger social surplus.
In fact, it could ask each consumer to share her data with the intermediary but commit
not to pass it along to the downstream firm. In exchange for this commitment, the data
intermediary would request a compensation from the consumer. Proposition 1 establishes
that each consumer would prefer that the demand information is not transferred to the firm.
Thus the remaining question is how large a compensation the data intermediary could extract
from the seller. This depends on the threat that the data intermediary can impose on the
individual consumer should she fail to sign up with the data intermediary. In the absence of
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an agreement with consumer i, the data intermediary could forward its estimate about the
demand of consumer i based on the information from all of the remaining consumers, and
this would indeed be the least favorable outcome for consumer i.
Proposition 10 (Commitment Solution)
Suppose the intermediary can commit to a data out-flow policy. Then the revenue-maximizing
data policy is to acquire the entire consumer data, and to never forward the data to the
downstream data.
This environment with commitment is related to the analysis in Lizzeri (1999), yet has
a number of different features. First, in Lizzeri (1999), the private information is held by a
single agent and there are multiple downstream firms that compete for the information, and
for the object offered by the agent. Second, the privately informed agent enters the contract
after she has observed her private information, thus an interim perspective is adopted.4 Yet,
the shared insight is that the intermediary with commitment power maybe able to extract
the information rent without any further influence on the effi ciency of the allocation relative
to the equilibrium outcome under uncertainty.
In both the commitment solution, and the sequentially optimal solution, we did not
impose any restrictions on the sign or size of the monetary payments. In the sequentially
optimal solution, every consumer receives a compensation for his marginal damage. In the
commitment solution, every consumer pays a fee to avoid information disclosure. We might
then ask what is the scope of data policy if the data intermediary can neither reward nor
punish the consumer. Thus, we are restricting the data intermediary to offer a data policy
that does not involve a monetary transaction with the consumer, or mi = 0, for all i.
Proposition 11 (Commitment Solution without Monetary Compensation)
Suppose the intermediary cannot use monetary transfers with the consumers, thus or mi = 0,
for all i. Then the optimal data policy is to collect all demand data and to enable the firm to
offer personalized price recommendation for each consumer i that does not use data provided
by consumer i.
Thus, in the absence of monetary transfers between data intermediary and consumer,
the data intermediary still acquires the demand data from all the consumers, but exercises
some restraint in its use. In particular, the data intermediary forwards only the data that
4The distinction between ex-ante and interim contracting may disappear in the setting of in Lizzeri (1999),
where the intermediary has a testing technology available which allows him to verify the private information
of the agent. Thus, one might be able to decentralize (or distribute) the ex-ante payment over the interim
state in such a way that in expectation the ex-ante and the interim contract are pay-off equivalent.
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will enable the firm to offer a personalized price to consumer i, where the personalized price
is computed without reference to the demand information provided by consumer i.5
5.3 Intermediation and Value Creation
In our baseline model, the consumer’s information is only used to set prices. As we have
seen this is, in a sense, the worst-case scenario for the intermediary. In particular, as data
transmission reduces total surplus, no intermediation is profitable without a suffi ciently
strong data externality. In practice, consumer data can be used in surplus-enhancing ways
as well. For example, information facilitates the provision of products and quality levels
targeted to the consumer’s tastes.
An immediate extension of our framework allows the firm to charge a unit price p and
to offer a quality level y to each consumer. (Argenziano and Bonatti (2019) provide a full
treatment of this model under a fixed information structure, i.e., without intermediation.)
Consumers are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the product, but they all value
quality uniformly,






with b̄ > 1. (The case b = 0 yields the baseline model.) The firm has a constant marginal
cost of quantity provision, and a fixed cost per consumer of quality production, thus
π = pq − cq − y2/2.
For this model, one can then show the following: (i) consumer surplus is decreasing
in the precision of the information transmitted by the intermediary if and only if b < 1;
(ii) information transmission increases total surplus if b > b̂ for some b̂ < 1; (iii) for any
b ≥ 0 there exists a critical n̄ such that all information is transmitted by the intermediary if
n ≥ n̄ (b); finally, the intermediary discloses the consumers’identities for b suffi ciently large.
In other words, the main message of Proposition 9 is that the data externality allows
for the profitable intermediation of information in a number of heterogeneous markets. For
suffi ciently strong data externalities, the intermediary will transmit all the data; whether the
outcome improves or diminishes total surplus, that depends on the use of the data. However,
there are no market forces that prevent the diffusion of socially detrimental information in
suffi ciently large markets.
5By contrast, without commitment, there is no trade of information without monetary transfers.
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6 Value of Social Data
Thus far, we have considered the optimal data policy for a given finite number of consumers,
and a single source of information. Perhaps, the defining feature of data markets is the large
number of (potential) participants and the large number of data sources and services. In
this section we pursue the implications of a large number of participants and data sources
for the social effi ciency of data markets and the price of data.
6.1 Many Consumers
We first consider what happens when the number of consumer possibly participating in the
data market and the product market grows. Thus we are considering what happens to prices
and revenue as N grows large and without bounds.
With every additional consumer, we receive additional information about idiosyncratic
and aggregate demand. In addition, each additional consumer presents an additional oppor-
tunity of trade in the downstream market. Thus, the feasible social surplus is additive in
each consumer.
Proposition 12 (Large Markets)
1. As n → ∞, the individual consumer’s compensation goes to zero, and the total com-
pensation converges to a finite positive value.



















3. The total compensation is decreasing in n if σ2ηi = 0.
4. As n→∞, the broker’s revenue and profit grow linearly in n.
5. The per capita profit of the data broker, m0 −mi, will increasingly converge to the per
capita profit when data is available “in the wild".
As the optimal data policy only estimates the common demand shock, each additional
signal contributed by each additional consumer has a rapidly decreasing marginal value. As





converges against a finite expressions. The decrease in the marginal contribution can be
strong enough to offset the increase in the number of consumers, and thus it can be less
expensive to acquire a larger dataset than a smaller dataset. Figure 6.1 illustrates.
As the data intermediary controls the access to the information, the revenue that it can
extract from the downstream is linear in the number of consumer. Thus, while the revenue
of the data intermediary is not convex over the entire range of the size of the consumer base,
it can have convex components, and the per capita profit of the data broker is increasing in
the number of the consumer population.
In our baseline model, the profit and the compensation are calculated in the interme-
diary’s most preferred equilibrium. A natural question is to ask whether the ability of the
broker to extract full surplus in per capita level will be preserved if we consider the inter-
mediary’s least preferred equilibrium. To answer this question, we could consider a “divide
and conquer" scheme where the broker will approach consumers sequentially and gives a
compensation conditioned on all consumers before have accepted their offers. In this scheme
the first consumer will receive a compensation matching all her loss which guarantees her
acceptance regardless of other consumers’decision. Given the first consumer will accept her
offer in all equilibria, the second consumer will accept regardless of the remaining consumers’
decision. And by a contagion argument we can guarantee the unique implementation of the
equilibrium, which brings a lower bound of the profit that the broker could guarantee.
Proposition 13 (Profit Lower Bound using Divide and Conquer) When the inter-
mediary use a divide and conquer compensation scheme.
• The total compensation will grow at a speed of O(log n), and the compensation per
capita will asymptotically decrease to 0.
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• The per capita profit of the data broker, m0 −mi, will also asymptotically increase to
the per capita profit when aggregate data is available “in the wild".
6.2 More Services, More Data
The second defining features of data markets is the rapid increase in data sources and data
services. For example, a service like Facebook connect allows the facebook to track consumers
across many websites. Additional service like Instagram, Snapchat, Facebook Open Graph,
Facebook Groups extends the number of sources at which information is collected from a
single consumer.6
We now consider the role of the precision in the collection of information. Each additional
source of information is creating an additional signal
si,k = wi + εk + εi,k. (19)
Thus, multiple sources of information generate additional signals about the willingness-to-
pay of the consumer. We consider k = 1, ..., K different sources of information. Multiple
sources of information clearly reduce the noise about consumer i, so σ̂2εi is decreasing. This
has a direct effect for the data policy, it increases the value of the information. In addition,
to the extent that we are increasing information from all consumers, the data intermediary
may be able to lower the total compensation of the data policy as the correlation among the
signals is increasing, and therefore the informational externality has the beneficial effect of
lowering total compensation necessary to acquire the data.
Proposition 14 (Precision in Information Collection)




2. The broker’s profit is convex in σ̂2εi
This captures the idea of more sources, more services, more data, and explains the role
of precision in acquiring idiosyncratic information. We could further break down costs
and revenues (which are proportional to one another, unlike in the case of the number of
consumers N).
With more information sources, the noise in each individual observation is decreasing.
As this strengthen the correlation in the signals, the informational externality is increasing,
this might lower the compensation necessary to the individual consumer.
6Similarly, Google offers a number of services, beginning with gmail, google maps, youtube, that gatehr
infromation about a consumer from many different sources.
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As we considered an increase in the data sources, we simply added more signals. In
particular, we did not change the structure of the data that the intermediary gathered from
the individual consumer. If the composition of the data would change as well, for example,
a new source would generate a differently weighted signal in terms of the common and
idiosyncratic shock, say
si,k = (1 + λk) θ + (1− λk) θi + ε+ εi,
then additional services would become even more valuable as they would generate more
information about the common and idiosyncratic shock.
7 Segmentation and Data
So far, we have defined the demand of an individual consumer in terms of a common and
an idiosyncratic component. The binary distinction was useful to bring about some of
the central implications of social data. A more complete description of consumer demand
should account for additional characteristics that are shared within a group of consumers,
but not necessarily common among all consumers. This might include characteristics such as
location, demographics, income, and wealth. In this section, we explore how these additional
characteristics may influence the value of intermediation and the information policy of the
data intermediary.
Towards this, we augment the description of the demand by the consumers to split the
population into two subsets:
wij = θj + θij, i = 1, 2, ..., Nj, j = 1, 2. (20)
We maintain the assumption that the group characteristics, θ1 and θ2, are normal random
variables, independently distributed with mean µ and variance σ2θ. The idiosyncratic com-
ponent θij remains normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ2θi , and all random
variables are independent. A more general model would have J groups of consumers, where
the size of each group is given by Nj. For the remainder of the analysis, we will assume that
each group has the same size, thus N1 = N2 = N/2.
Thus, each member in group j has the same common component. Across groups, the
common component is drawn from the same distribution with the same mean, thus ex-ante
the groups are identical. A natural extension would be to allow for different means and




The identity of each consumer is now given by the pair (i, j), which determines his
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personal identity as well as his group characteristics. We then ask whether and under what
conditions the data intermediary may collect and transmit group characteristics.
7.1 Group Segmentation
By collecting information about the group characteristics, the intermediary will also influence
the extent of price discrimination. For example, by choosing not to provide the group
characteristic to the firm, the intermediary will induce the firm to offer a single price by
sending the sample average of all signals. Alternatively the intermediary could allow the firm
to discriminate between two groups of consumers by transmitting the group characteristics.
By allowing price discrimination across groups, the intermediary is able to charge higher fee
from the firm, but it also increase the compensation owed to consumers.
For the purpose of this section, we shall restrict attention to noiseless signals by the
consumers, thus ri = wi.
Proposition 15 (Segmentation)
With noiseless signals, there exists N , such that for all N > N , the data intermediary will
induce group pricing.
Thus, while the earlier Proposition 8 stated that the seller will not elicit any identity
information, the present result shows that if the individual group is suffi ciently large, then
the intermediary will convey some limited identity information, and this will allow the seller
to price discriminate across groups, but not within groups. We expect these results to extend
to a noisy signal environment.
The benefits of segmentation along group identity arise from similar sources as in the
aggregate market.
Proposition 16 (Comparative Statics of Segmentation)
With noiseless signals, the threshold N is decreasing in the variance of the common compo-




The limited amount of price discrimination, which optimally operates at the group level
rather than at the individual level, can explain the behavior of many platforms. For example,
Uber and Amazon claim that they do not discriminate at the individual level, but they use
price discrimination based on location and time, and other dimension that effectively capture
group characteristics.7
7The discussion and the results here are somewhat sensitive to what we assume what happens if we allow
personalized pricing yet do not use personal information on buyer i.
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Finally, the optimality of using a richer pricing model when larger datasets are available
is reminiscent of model selection criteria under overfitting concerns, e.g., the Akaike infor-
mation criterion. In our setting, however, the optimality of inducing segmentation is entirely
driven by the intermediary’s cost-benefit analysis of acquiring more precise information from
consumers. As the data externality grows suffi ciently strong, acquiring the data becomes
cheaper, and the intermediary takes advantage of the richer structure of consumer demand.8
7.2 Identification and Personalized Pricing
We established earlier in Proposition 8 that the data intermediary will not collect information
that would allow for personalized prices at the level of the individual. This conclusion might
not hold anymore if there is prior information that the consumer may belong to different
groups, but importantly neither the consumer nor the intermediary know a priori which
consumer belongs to which group.
Thus, suppose each consumer shares her characteristics with either one of the groups,
but neither she nor the intermediary would know which group she belongs to. Then there
are instances where the intermediary would ask for identity information as it would help to
bring the information of similar consumers to bear on the demand estimation problem.
Proposition 17 restricts attention to the noiseless case.
Proposition 17 (Bayesian Identification and Price Discrimination)
Asymptotically as N → ∞, personalized pricing is more profitable than uniform pricing if
and only if:
σ2θ ≥ σ2θi (21)
The learning and classification problem that arises when we elicit information from the
individual consumer, for example, the determination of the relevant characteristics is an issue
that is an open question for which the current framework is too limited.
The group characteristics and the scale of the data could also interact here. Suppose the
data intermediary receives more information from more services. Then this should support
more group characteristics.
The model of group characteristics introduced above,
wij = θj + θij, i = 1, 2, ..., Nj, j = 1, 2, (22)
8For a demand-side explanation of a similar phenomenon, Olea, Ortoleva, Pai, and Prat (2019) show that
buyers who employ a richer pricing model will be willing to pay incrementally more for larger datasets.
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can be augmented in a number of ways. As the common component in the demand, it refers
to group characteristics, but as we saw it does not have to refer to all agents. Suppose
then there is a large number of group characteristics, then additional members are valuable
because the increase the group size, and thus increase the informational externality. Then, if
the group characteristic are drawn from the same distribution the inference becomes weaker
with the number of participants, unless the intermediary can distinguish them.
In the above, we simply assumed that the group membership can be identified. A more
plausible approach is that new data services allow the intermediary to gather the data to
enable the distinction. This would mean that services would increases the power of inference.
8 Competitive Brokers
To study the question “does competition promote privacy protection?”, we can look at the
model with m brokers. Our model is able to articulate these policy relevant questions by
introducing heterogeneity in a way that is pertinent to information markets.
Each broker j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} is characterized by an upper bound on the information it
can collect. We specify a lower bound xj on the variance of the idiosyncratic noise that is
specific to that broker. The j-specific noise terms εi,j are independent across both i and j.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The brokers simultaneously offer payments and information structures to all consumers.
2. Consumers choose a subset of offers to accept and transmit the corresponding signals.
3. Given the information collected, the brokers simultaneously decide what to sell and
offer prices to the monopolist.
4. The monopolist decides which databases to purchase and sets prices for the consumers.
In our setting (though by no means in general) informative signals have decreasing re-
turns. This can be shown by direct calculation using the formula for the residual variance
of the monopolist’s beliefs. Now we consider the equilibrium where each intermediary j
sells access to an exogenous database consisting of reports sij, i ∈ Sj from consumers. The
following proposition characterizes the unique equilibrium for this subgame as long as the
databases are imperfect.
Proposition 18 (Unique Pricing Subgame)
If xj > 0 for all j, given the data collected, there exist a unique equilibrium in which inter-
mediary j sells their database at a price pj = π(J)−π(J\{j}), and the monopolist purchases
all databases.
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It is worthwhile to point out that the uniqueness result will break down when x = 0, i.e.,
if the broker could collect perfect information from consumers. In this extreme case, once
one broker gets one copy of report from consumer i, any other report about i collected by
the other broker is useless for the firm. Therefore in the pricing subgame, once a report of
consumer i is sold, the other broker becomes indifferent as to whether to sell i’s information,
which breaks the unique equilibrium price in that subgame. This causes multiplicity of
equilibria, as in Ichihashi (2019).
To proceed our analysis in the data market, we focus on a particular class of equilibria
where consumers choose the maximal accepting set.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium Refinement) For any given offers {pij, εij, εj}, the accepting
sets of consumers {Ai} are maximal. That is, there is no other acceptance set {A′i} that is
an equilibrium of the subgame induced by {pij, εij, εj} such that Ai ⊂ A′i for all i and Ai ( A′i
for some i.
This assumption is implicitly embedded in our baseline model of monopoly broker by
focusing on broker-most-preferred equilibrium. And it is clear that we could never expect
any uniqueness result without equilibrium selection in this contracting with externalities
model where coordination among consumers is crucial.9
Proposition 19 (Unique Equilibrium Prediction)
Suppose σ2θi = 0, then in every pure equilibrium each broker will collect information from
every consumers, with both noises as small as possible: σ2∗εi,j = xj, σ
2∗
εj
= 0. Consumers will
be indifferent between reporting to all brokers and keeping privacy.
The result is intuitive at the first glance since fixing the interaction of the consumers with
other brokers, marginal information about the common shock θ will always bring positive
profit to broker j when σ2θi = 0. However, the formal proof is much more involved, because
the interaction between consumers and other brokers will be affected by the offer between
consumers and broker j itself. Consumers’willingness to accept offers from other brokers
will increase as broker j collect more precise information. Therefore the broker might have
a incentive to strategically collect less information from consumers in the hope to persuade
them to reject offers from other brokers. By this deviation, the broker might gain more
bargaining power in the downstream product market and sell his database at a higher price
even with less information collected.
9The problem of consumers’ coordination is different from the problem caused by perfect information
collection. Even with maximal accepting assumption, multi equilibria will appear in perfect information
collection setting because Proposition 18 does not hold.
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Our prediction pins down the information structure, the total compensation to consumers
and the transfer between brokers and downstream firm. Consequently, consumers surplus,
producer surplus and total profit of brokers are uniquely determined. The only undetermined
variable is the specific compensation paid by each broker. This comes from the fact that
generically consumers’marginal loss from reporting to one broker, given she has reported
to other firm, is smaller than the compensation provided by that broker. For example, if a
consumer allows Facebook, Twitter, Amazon, and other countless other apps to access their
phone’s data, further exchanging data for the service of Google Map sounds like a great deal.
To establish existence and carry out some comparative statics, we focus on the symmetric
equilibrium where each broker offers the same compensation to each consumer.
Proposition 20 (Symmetric Equilibrium)
Suppose σ2θi = 0, then for any (n,m, σ
2
θ) , there exists x large enough such that, if xA =
xB ≥ x, there exists a symmetric equilibrium where each broker pays the same compensation
to every consumers.
We now compare the equilibrium outcome under competition with that under monopoly.
Proposition 21 (Comparative Statics)
1. The individual brokers’ provision of information equals the monopoly level, and the
total provision of information will increase in the number of brokers, m (m = 1 is the
case of monopoly).
2. Consumer surplus is decreasing in m, and increasing in x.
3. Brokers’profit is decreasing in m, while the firm’s profit is increasing in m.
This result highlights the possibility that, instead of protecting consumers’privacy, com-
petition may make things worse. Competing brokers in the unique equilibrium collect data
exactly the same way as they will in the monopoly environment. Each broker’s profit will
decrease, which is purely because of a loss of bargaining power against the firm in the prod-
uct market. Product firms get additional portion of surplus extracted from consumers, and
consumers surplus decreases even further due to the multiple sourcing of information. Apart
from the analysis of entry, our model also gives predictions in terms of mergers: the equilib-
rium noise level is the same whether the firms merge or compete and consumers surplus and
social surplus remain unchanged. (Of course the price of data and profits will change.)
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9 Discussion and Conclusion
Variance Reduction The data transfer allows the downstream merchant to better match
the supply to the demand, this enables value creation. The data transfer also allows him
to better match the price to the demand, this enables value extraction. The linear price
discrimination environment enables both value creation and value extraction. This gives a
particular combination of how valuable the variance reduction in their posterior estimate of
the demand is for each of the participants. The net effect across all the market participants
can have social positive or negative effects. For the pricing and the effi ciency of the data
market, it is the differential margins that matter. But clearly, the insights here generalize,
and allows us to consider other market environments.
Personalization The additive model of idiosyncratic and common shock is a specific model
by which value is generated. We could consider different linear, convex combination, both
for the firm and the consumer. This in turn would enable different policies and different
interests. For example, the firm could be able to tailor less, even offer separate products for
common and idiosyncratic shocks, through personalization and other product policies.
State and Model In the present analysis, we considered a model of data sharing where
the data intermediary and the firm know the structure of the model, the additive structure
of idiosyncratic and common shock. But an important aspect of the data is that it allows the
intermediary to learn/estimate the structure and then make the prediction for a specific data
profile. This second aspect/value of data is something that is currently not in the model,
and would give an additional reason/benefit to accumulate the data. This would suggest a
dynamic model of learning and data acquisition.
Data Platform The data intermediary collected and redistributed the consumer data
but played no role in the interaction between consumer and firm. By contrast, often the
consumer access or can access the firm only trough a data platform. The data platform
can then be thought of as selling the access (often through an auction) to the consumer
among the highest bidders. The data platform provides the bidding firm with additional
information that the firms can use to tailor their interaction with the consumers.
The data platform typically allows the consumer to access the service/site for free and
possibly offer additional services/products to generate more information. Thus the interac-
tion is monetized only among the competing firms. The competitive allocation of the access
to the consumer through a bidding mechanism allows the platform to introduce an element
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of “reverse price discrimination.”Thus even if the firm sets the price uniform across all con-
sumers, it bids vis-à-vis the platform in information/type dependent way. Thus, the price
setting across all consumer interactions might be influenced by the bidding behavior even if
the discriminatory aspect does not appear in the uniform price setting.10
10For example, Amazon does not, nor does it allow its vendors to use price discrimination. On the other
hand, the advertising on the site is distributed and priced using consumer characteristics.
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10 Appendix
The Appendix collects the proofs of all the results in the main body of the paper.
Proof of Proposition 2. The demand function of consumer i is qi(wi, pi) = wi − pi.











































Since what matters is the second order moment, we have omitted the constant term which
will equals E [pi] = µ/2. Similarly for consumer i = k + 1, ..., n whose data and identity is
















The value of information to the merchant, as a function of k, is:





































If σ2θ = 0, each individual data will unlock one additional personalized price. The additional

























If σ2θi = 0, the firm will always charge a uniform price, and he will use the additional data to
























Now, g(k) is clearly increasing with respect k. The remaining results directly follow the













SS(k) = TCS(k) + g(k) = SS(0)− 1
2
g(k),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. When the identity of the consumer is not known, then the





































































which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5. First we derive the expression of profit. Given the information








Moreover, denote pi the price under null information I, p′i the price under full information






As for the marginal compensate for consumer, we have:
∆CSi = −E[p′iwi −
1
2



















Then we can calculate the profit of the intermediary:
8g − 8Σi∆CSi = Σni=1 − var(E[wi|I]) + 3V ar(E[wi|I−i])
= Σni=1 cov(wi, 3E[wi|I−i]− E[wi|I])
= Σni=1 cov(θ + θi, 3E[θ|I−i]− E[θ|I]− E[θi|I])


































+ n(σ2θ + σ
2
ε))
















The revenue of the broker is simply :








































































































































































































































with respect to σ2θi:
∂h
∂σ2θi




























































































































If σ2θ ≥ σ2ε then the per capital profit will be increasing.
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Proof of Proposition 6. We first derive the expression of profit. Given the information
I, since the firm has no identity information, it is optimal to set a uniform price (we will










Denote p0 the price under null information I0, p1 the price under full information I1, and
p−j the price under I−j when information from all consumers except j is collected. Then











As for the marginal compensate for consumer, we have:




















Therefore the total profit for the broker is:



















































































Denote A = 8R/(nσ2θ + σ
2
θi
), whose sign will indicate the profitability of intermediation.
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2σ2θ − σ2θi) + ((2n(n− 1) + 1)σ
2











When 2n2σ2θ < σ
2
θi




strictly increasing with respect to n, thus the threshold n exists.
To prove the monotonicity of profit with respect to σ2θ and σ
2
θi
, we will prove A is increas-
ing with respect to σ2θ and decreasing with respect to σ
2
θi
. And consequently n is (weakly)


































The last two term in the above equation is clearly increasing w.r.t. σ2θ, and we have proved






















which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7. For any fixed parameter, denote R as the profit when the
broker transmits only the demand information but not the identity information, while we
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Therefore, for any fixed parameters, transmitting aggregate information only is more prof-
itable for the intermediary. The first statement about the thresholds is a direct corollary of
this result.
Proof of Proposition 8. Since now we are in a world of information design, σ2εi might
not be symmetric among different consumers, so we re-derive the profit of the broker:

























































































































































Note that when nσ2θ < σ
2
θi
, the profit is always negative.
If nσ2θ > σ
2
θi
. We will first show that it is optimal to use a symmetric idiosyncratic noise
scheme. To find the optimal idiosyncratic noise σ2εi fixing other parameters, it is equivalently
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1 + Σi 6=jxj
.
Where A,B > 0. For any {xi} such that x1 6= x2, then x′1 = x′2 = (x1 + x2)/2 will strictly
increase the objective.
Now since we have shown the optimality of the symmetric noise scheme, we can reuse
the expression of A in the previous analysis.
A =


































Note that the numerator is a positive affi ne function of σ2ε thus the profit will eventually






Proof of Proposition 9. In Proposition 8 we showed that it is optimal to use a
symmetric noise scheme so that we could use the expression derived before safely. We first
prove σ∗εi = σ̂εi simply by pointing out that, if σ
2
εi
does not reach the lower bound, by
changing σ̄2ε = σ
2
ε + σ
2, and σ̄2εi = σεi − (n− 1)σ
2, A will strictly increase and so will R.






























(n− 1)2(3nσ2θ − σ2θi)

































) = −2(n− 1)2n2(nσ2θ − σ2θi)
Therefore the numerator is a quadratic function of σ2ε with negative quadratic term. It has
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two real zero point and the larger one is:
σ∗ =







































which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 10. As we are considering the general information design
problem, we use the general formula derived in the case of personalized price11, to express
the profit as well as the necessary compensation to the consumers:

















Since by definition I−i ⊂ F(s1, ..., ŝi, ...sn), we have:
R ≤ −0 + 3
8
Σni=1 var(E[wi|F(s1, ..., ŝi, ...sn)])
where the inequality binds when I contains no information and I−i contains all signals
collected.
Proof of Proposition 11. The revenue of the broker is given by:












11We can not use formula in the case of uniform price because there we directly use the fact that the
broker does not collect id: E[θi′ |I] = E[θi|I].
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s.t. var(E[wi|I])− var(E[wi|I−i]) ≥ 0.






s.t. var(E[wi|I])− var(E[wi|I−i]) ≥ 0.
Then any information structure such that I−i = F(s1, ..., ŝi, ...sn) and var(E[wi|I]) = var(E[wi|I−i]),
i.e. use all the off-path information for personalized price and keep consumers at the same
surplus level on the path, will maximize our original problem.




























































































3n3σ4θ + 2 (4n






























3n2σ4θ − 2nσ2θσ2θi + σ
2
θi
















Thus asymptotically, it is optimal to set σ2ε = σ̂
2
ε, and the per capita profit equals the one
gained when aggregate data is “in the wild”(see the proof of Proposition 3).
Proof of Proposition 13. When the intermediary provides a "divide and conquer"
compensation scheme for the individual compensation, the total compensation would be:


































































































Thus asymptotically the average compensation will decrease to 0. Now we calculate the total






























































































= n2σ2θ + nσ
2
θi














Therefore it is asymptotically optimal to set σ2ε = σ̂
2
ε and the per capita profit will increase
to the one gained when aggregate data is “in the wild".\




optimal common noise is max{σ̂2ε, σ∗}, where:
σ∗ =







































So for fixed n, σ2θ and σ
2
θi




are done. When it is not, we prove that σ∗ < 0 so that σ∗ε = σ̂ε is a constant. In fact,






























Then we can show that the constant term is also negative:
















<(2n2 − 2n3)σ4θ − (2n− 2n2)σ2θσ2θi = (2n− 2n
2)σ2θ(nσ
2
θ − σ2θi) < 0.
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2(n− 1)(3nσ2θ − σ2θi)




























2(n− 1)(3nσ2θ − σ2θi)

























3n((n− 1)(σ2ε + σ2θ) + σ2εi + σ2θi)
(
2(2σ2ε(n− 1)n(nσ2θ − σ2θi)
+ σ2εi(n(2n− 3)σ
2
θ − 2nσ2θi + σ
2
θi
) + (nσ2θ + σ
2
θi






























3n((n− 1)(σ2ε + σ2θ) + σ2εi + σ2θi)
> 0
Where the last equation holds when σε ≥ σ∗ and nσ2θ ≥ σ2θi . Now since for fixed parameters




lower bound, will also be a convex function of this lower bound.
Proof of Proposition 15. We first derive the expression of profit in these two cases. In




































CS = − 3
4n
g














n(2n− 1)σ2θ + (2n− 1)σ2θi
(n2 + (n− 1)2)(σ2θ + σ2ε) + (2n− 1)(σ2θi + σ2εi)
s̄−ji
CS−ji =
n(2n− 1)σ2θ + (2n− 1)σ2θi









Therefore the revenue for the broker is:











































In the two price scheme, the intermediary reports two signal about the average demand
of two natural group respectively:
E[Σit1i| I],E[Σit2i|I].

























































4(n− 1)(3nσ2θ − σ2θi)











(2(n− 1)n+ 1)σ2θ + (2n− 1)σ2θi
+ 2
)




Therefore the difference is monotonically decreasing in n for n ≥ 2. Notice that from previous
result, R2 < 0 as long as σ2θi/σ
2








n(8(n− 2)n+ 5)σ2θ + n(6− 8n)σ2θi − σ
2
θi









(8n2 − 16n+ 5)n
(8n− 6)n+ 1 <
8n2 − 16n+ 5
8n− 5 < n.
Thus the one price scheme will be able to bring positive profit when group pricing could not,








Thus π1−π2 < 0 when n is suffi ciently large, which proves the existence of the threshold.




(n− 1)2n2(2(n− 1)n+ 1) (8n2 + 3)σ8θ + 2(n− 1)n2 (8n2 + 3) (n(4n− 5) + 2)σ6θσ2θi
16n((n− 1)σ2θ + σ2θi)2(2(n− 1)nσ
2





2(2n− 1)(n(n(4n(4n− 7) + 21)− 13) + 3)σ2θσ6θi + (2n− 3)(2n− 1)
3σ8θi
16n((n− 1)σ2θ + σ2θi)2(2(n− 1)nσ
2





(2n(n(n(n(48(n− 2)n+ 83)− 55) + 27)− 9) + 3)σ4θσ4θi
16n((n− 1)σ2θ + σ2θi)2(2(n− 1)nσ
2





Therefore the threshold is decreasing with respect to σ2θ. Notice that in the noiseless case, it
is the ratio of σ2θ/σ
2
θi
that decides the sign of R1 − R2, therefore the threshold is increasing
with respect to σ2θi .
Proof of Proposition 17. From the expression derived in the proof of proposition,










While from the expression derived in the proof of proposition, the asymptotic per capita







which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 18. We first verify that the candidate equilibrium indeed con-
stitutes an equilibrium. On the monopoly side, when it faces the equilibrium prices, suppose
purchasing D ( J is optimal for monopoly. If J\D = {j}, then by construction, purchasing
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J is equally well for monopoly and thus optimal. If J\D contains two intermediaries, sup-
pose j is one of them. Since the value for information is decreasing, and the information is
not perfect due to condition σ̂2εi > 0, we have:
π({j} ∪D)− π(D) > π(J)− π(J\{j}) = pj.
Thus purchasing D is worse than D ∪ {j} which is a contradiction.
On the intermediaries side, fixed other intermediaries pricing p¬j, suppose it is optimal
for intermediary j to report p′j > pj. Then denote monopoly would purchase database from
D. By construction we know D 6= J , otherwise it is better not to purchase from j. For
the same reason as last paragraph is also impossible for J\D to contains two intermediaries.
Therefore it is only possible that {j′} = J\D. However, since
π̄(J\{j})− π̄(D) = (π(J\{j})− Σk∈J\{j}pk)− (π(D)− Σk∈Dpk)
= −(π(J)− π(J\{j})) + p′j + π(J)− π(D)− pj′
= −(π(J)− π(J\{j})) + p′j > 0.
Therefore D is not optimal, this contradiction completes the verification of the equilibrium.
Now we proceed to uniqueness. We first argue that in any equilibrium, intermediary j
could get payoff higher than π(J) − π(J\{j}). Suppose in contradiction j only get uj <
π(J)−π(J\{j}) in a equilibrium, he could always sell his product at pj such that uj < pj <
π(J)−π(J\{j}) and the monopoly would buy his database regardless of its purchasing plan,
because of decreasing return of information.
Suppose in the equilibrium one intermediary j sells his database at pj > π(J)−π(J\{j}),
from last paragraph we know pj′ ≥ π(J) − π(J\{j′}). Therefore on the equilibrium path,
optimally reacted monopoly would not purchase all the database, but this is a contradiction
since the rejected intermediary will only get 0 on this equilibrium path.
Before we proceed to prove Proposition 19, we prove three lemmas first.
Lemma 1 (Unique Equilibrium for Accepting Game)
For given offers {(pji, εij, εj)}, the maximal accepting set is unique.
Proof. Suppose there are two maximal accepting sets {Ai} 6= {Āi}. We will construct
accepting sets {A∞i } such that A∞i ⊃ Ai ∪ Āi ∀i which brings a contradiction.
We will use a iterated expanding approach to complete the construction. Denote A0i =
Ai ∪ Āi. Denote also CSi(Ai, A¬i) as consumers gross pay off when accepting sets are {Ai}.
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Since {Ai} and {Āi} are equilibrium choices, we have:
CSi(Ai, A¬i)− CSi(Ai\Bi, A¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ Ai,
CSi(Āi, Ā¬i)− CSi(Āi\Bi, Ā¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ Āi.





¬i)− CSi(A0i \Bi, A0¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ Ai, or ∀Bi ⊂ Āi.










¬i)− CSi(A0i \Bi, A0¬i) + Σj∈B̄ipji
+CSi(A
0
i \Bi, A0¬i)− CSi(A0i \(Bi ∪ B̄i), A0¬i) + Σj∈B̄ipji ≥ 0.





¬i)− CSi(A0i \Bi, A0¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ A0i .
If ∀i, @∅ 6= Bi ⊂ (A0i )c such that
CSi(A
0
i ∪B0i , A0¬i)− CSi(A0, A0¬i) + Σj∈B0i pji ≤ 0.
Then we end the construction and denote A0i = A
∞




i ∪ B0i . Again





¬i)− CSi(A1i \Bi, A1¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ A1i .





¬i)− CSi(A∞i \Bi, A∞¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ A∞i ,
CSi(A
∞
i ∪Bi, A∞¬i)− CSi(A∞i , A∞¬i) + Σj∈Bipji < 0 ∀∅ 6= Bi ⊂ (A∞i )c.
To verify that {A∞i } is indeed an equilibrium for accepting game, we still need to check
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¬i)− CSi(A∞i ∪ Ci, A∞¬i)− Σj∈Cipji
+CSi(A
∞
i ∪ Ci, A∞¬i)− CSi(Bi ∪ Ci, A∞¬i) + Σj∈A∞i \Bipji





¬i)− CSi(Bi, A∞¬i) + Σj∈A∞i \Bipji
> 0,
which completes the proof.
Note that the proof also shows that consumer strictly prefer maximal accepting set over
other smaller accepting set.
Denote {Āi} as the the maximal accepting set given offers {(pji, εij, εj)}. Considering
any larger accepting set (which is not an equilibrium for the accepting game), we next show
that there must be one consumer strictly prefer a smaller accepting plan.
Lemma 2 (Want Less When Asked More)
For any {Ai} ) {Āi}, ∃ i and Bi ( Ai such that:
CSi(Ai, A¬i)− CSi(Ai\Bi, A¬i) + Σj∈Bipji < 0.
Proof. Suppose not, then we have
CSi(Ai, A¬i)− CSi(Ai\Bi, A¬i) + Σj∈Bipji ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ Ai.
Since {Ai} is strictly larger than maximal accepting set, it is not an equilibrium accepting
set, therefore ∃ i and A′i such that A′1i is more profitable than Ai. Choose A1i such that A1i is
the minimal one, i.e. none of its real subset is profitable than Ai. Then it is easy to see that




i , A¬i)− CSi(Bi, A¬i) + Σj∈A1i \Bipji ≥ 0.
Then we can use the tricks of iterated expanding again, and get {A∞i } ) {Ai} such that
{A∞i } is a equilibrium accepting set, which is a contradiction.




) 6= (0, 0), then every intermediary entering the market will collect data from
every consumers.
52
Proof. Suppose on the equilibrium path, intermediary j′ does not collect data from
consumer i′. Denote the equilibrium accepting set, which is maximal accepting set, as {Ai}.
We will construct a profitable deviation for j′ for contradiction, we will fixed common noise
in our construction.
As we can see in the proof of the unique accepting equilibrium, we know that facing
the equilibrium prices, consumers strictly prefer Ai then other larger set. Equivalently, the
following inequality holds strictly:
CSi(Ai, A¬i)− CSi(Bi, A¬i)− Σj∈Bi\Aipij > 0 ∀Bi ) Ai.
From Lemma 2 we know that for any strictly larger {Āi}, there exist i and B̄i such that
consumer i prefers B̄i over Āi:
CSi(Āi, Ā¬i)− CSi(Āi\B̄i, Ā¬i) + Σj∈B̄ipji < 0.








=∞)− CSi(Āi\B̄i, Ā¬i, σ2εi′j′ =∞) + Σj∈B̄ipji < 0.
Here, when followed with the third argument, CSi is the hypothetical gross utility for con-
sumer i from final goods market if all consumers’accepting sets are {Ai} and in addition,
consumer i′ report data to intermediary j′ with idiosyncratic noise εi′j′ . The equilibrium
path could be represented by setting σ2εi′j′ =∞.
Now we have a system of finite strict inequality which are continuous with respect to
σ2εi′j′ . Thus intermediary j
′ could find a σ2ε∗
i′j′





)− CSi(Bi, A¬i, σ2ε∗
i′j′





)− CSi(Āi\B̄i, Ā¬i, σ2ε∗
i′j′
) + Σj∈B̄ipji < 0. (24)
Moreover, from the equilibrium condition we have:
CSi(Ai, A¬i,∞)− CSi(Bi, A¬i,∞) + Σj∈Aipij − Σj∈Bipij ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ Ai.





)− CSi(Bi, A¬i, σ2ε∗
i′j′
) + Σj∈Aipij − Σj∈Bipij ≥ 0 ∀Bi ⊂ Ai. (25)
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Now consider a deviation from intermediary j′ such that he remain εj′ , εij′ , pj′i ∀i 6= i′
unchanged, set εi′j′ = ε∗i′j′ and offer a price p
∗
j′i′ to consumer i
′ which keep i′ exactly indifferent
among Ai′ and Ai′ ∪ {j′}:




)− CSi′(Ai′ , A¬i′ ,∞) + p∗j′i′ = 0.
Now we will verify first that Ai ∪ {j′} and A¬i are indeed optimal choice for each consumer,
and second that they are maximal. By this two conclusion, we can ensure it is the unique
outcome if intermediary j′ makes such deviation.
First, from inequality 23 we know given other consumers choose {Ai∪{j′}, A¬i}, consumer
i 6= i′ prefer Ai over any larger set and consumer i′ prefer Ai′ ∪{j′} over any larger set. From
inequality 25 we know all consumers prefer Ai over any smaller set. Moreover, since by
construction of p∗j′i′ , i
′ is indifferent between Ai and Ai ∪ {j′}. Then we know (with a trick
used frequently before) that Ai ∪ {j′} and A¬i is indeed optimal choice for each consumer.
Second, for any set {Āi} ) {Ai} such that j′ /∈ Āi′ , inequality 24, therefore {Āi∪{j′}, Ā¬i}
can not be equilibrium choices for consumers. Thus no set larger than {Ai ∪ {j′}, A¬i}
could be equilibrium choice. One last step to lead to the contradiction is to verify such
deviation is profitable. From previous analysis we know that the information collected by
other intermediary would remain unchanged, thus we can simply denote their signal simply




) 6= (0, 0) that information could not be perfect, we must have σ2δj > 0. The signal












On the other hand, the extra fee intermediary j′ could charge to the monopoly, according to
Proposition ?? is:







Thus as long as n ≥ 2, such deviation is always profitable.






ε), so there is one broker add extra noise in either common part or idiosyncratic part.
From Proposition 3 we know in any equilibrium Ai = J for any i. Consider a deviation
from intermediary j′: he simply change (σ2εij′ , σ
2
εj′
) to (σ̂2εi , σ̂
2
ε) and increases compensation
to p∗j′i + ε where




)− CSi(J, σ2εij′ ).
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, σ2εj′ )− CSi(Bi, J, σ
2
εij′
, σ2εj′ ) + Σj∈J\Bipij ≥ 0 ∀Bi.




, σ̂2ε)− CSi(Bi, J, σ̂2εi , σ̂
2
ε) + Σj∈J\Bipij > 0 ∀Bi ⊃ {j′}.







) + Σj∈J\(Bi∪{j′})pij + p
∗
ij′ + ε
≥ CSi(J, σ2εij′ )− CSi(Bi, σ
2
εij′
) + Σj∈J\Bipij + ε > 0 ∀Bi ⊂ {j′c}
Therefore J will still be consumer i’s optimal choice given other all accept J . other con-
sumers on the other hand prefer J even more because more information is revealed by i.
Therefore every consumers accepting every broker is indeed a equilibrium outcome, and it is
the outcome induced by the deviation in our setting since it is clearly the largest. A similar
argument as in Proposition 3 then shows that this deviation is profitable, which leads to the
contradiction.
At last we will prove the indifference condition from consumers side. Suppose consumer
i strictly prefers reporting to all intermediaries to none, then denote C = {C1, C2, ...} as the
set of all optimal accepting choices for i given others all accept J (J ∈ C). Note that C is
complete under set inclusion, because if C1 6⊂ C2, C2 6⊂ C1, and they are equally good, then
by decreasing return C1 ∪ C2 is strictly better. Thus we could assume C1 6⊂ C2 6⊂ ... 6⊂ J .
By assumption we know C1 6= ∅.
Then consider a deviation for j′ ∈ C1, he could deviate by making pij′ epsilon smaller.
Under this deviation and assuming other consumers all choose J , every accepting choice in
C brings less utility to consumer i equally and is still strictly better than the rest, thus it is
still optimal for i to choose J . So every consumers accept all offers are still an equilibrium
outcome under this deviation and (since it is clearly maximal) is our selected equilibrium.
This deviation is profitable to j′ which makes a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 20 As we have just argue in the main text. In the symmetric
candidate equilibrium, the potential deviation for the broker is to deviate to some infor-
mation structure with higher noise such that he could persuade consumers not to provide
any information to other brokers. The following lemma characterizes “the most profitable
deviation":
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Lemma 4 (The Maximal Deviation in Symmetric Candidate)
The optimal deviation for the broker can be calculated by assuming broker j′ deviates sym-




> 0 and price p∗ij′ such that:
1. conditional on every other consumer report their information only to j′, consumer is
indifferent between reporting to no one and only to j′.;
2. conditional on every other consumer report their information to all brokers, consumer
is indifferent between reporting only to j′ and to all brokers.
Proof. Suppose there is a profitable deviation for broker j′, and denote it as {ε∗ij′ , ε∗j′ , p∗ij′},
and the accepting set it induces as {A∗i }. If such deviation does not reduce the information
that other brokers collect, i.e. A∗i = Ai = J ∀i 6= i′, then we know such deviation is not
profitable for sure.
Now we will argue that A∗i ⊂ {j′} for every profitable deviation. Suppose not, then there
must be some consumer i0 report to some other broker j0 6= j′. Note by previous paragraph
we know at least one consumer i1 does not report to some other broker j1 6= j′. Therefore











∪ {j1}, A∗¬i1)− CSi(A
∗
i1
, A∗¬i1) + pij ≤ 0.
Note the other broker’s compensation pij is the same since we are considering the symmet-
ric candidate. But this two inequalities contradict with decreasing return and imperfect
information transmission. (This is a stronger form of decreasing return.)
Now since A∗i ⊂ {j′}, we could assume A∗i = {j′} and put σ2εij′ =∞, pij′ = 0 when j
′ is
actually not collecting data from i.
Up to now, we have argued that if a profitable deviation exist, it must induce A∗i = {j′},
what remaining is to set noise level and compensation optimally under the constraint. It is
clear that to support A∗i = {j′} under maximal accepting assumption, we need at least these
two conditions:
1. p∗ij′ need to at least make consumer indifferent between reporting to j
′ and to none,
conditioned on other consumers only report to j′;
2. the noise shall be large enough so that every consumer reporting to every broker is not
an equilibrium outcome.
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Since we are just considering deviation from symmetric candidate equilibrium, if con-
sumer i find it attractive to report to j 6= j′, by decreasing return, she shall find it also
attractive to report to any other j 6= j′. Therefore the second requirement is equivalent to:
the noise shall be large enough so that, even when all other consumers report to all brokers,
reporting only to j′ is better than reporting to all.
On the other hand, because of symmetry again, once these two conditions are satisfied, we
know every consumer report only to j′ is the maximal accepting set: now that the consumer
do not want to report to j 6= j′ even when all other consumers reporting to all brokers, they
will never want to do so when less information is transmitted.
Now we need to pin down the noise level. By rescaling and aggregating all the noisy
reports with proper weight, we can represent the signal collected by broker j′ on the equi-

















Therefore, by reduce σ2εij′ (or increase 1/σ
2
εij′
if you worry about infinity) and increase σ2εj′
correspondingly to keep σ2δ unchanged, we could always reduce σ
2
δi
. This is profitable because
it weakens the consumers’bargaining power and reduces the necessary compensation. Thus
we know it is optimal to set σ2εij′ = 0.
What left is the level of common noise. The requirement that A∗i = {j′} gives a system
of lower bounds for common noise, and according to decreasing return, the most stringent
one is:
CSi({j′∗¬i)− CSi(J,A∗¬i) + (|J | − 1)pij ≥ 0.
The broker j′ would always want to decrease noise level as long as the above inequality
is satisfied. Thus the ’optimal deviation’is to provide an information structure with zero
idiosyncratic noise and some common noise which make this constraint binding. 12.
12It’s not the optimal one because when the constraint is binding, the maximal accepting assumption
would lead to A∗i = J . But the noise level could be as close to this as possible.
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